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ANTITRUST AND ZONING-HOW MUCH
RESPECT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
a
There are 79,862 units of local government in the United
States,' and many of these governments restrain trade
through zoning. Restraints of trade and combinations' of per-
sons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce are federal
antitrust violations.3 States, however, are implicitly excluded
from the coverage of the federal antitrust laws under Parker
v. Brown." Municipalities had rested safely behind the holding
of Parker until a majority of the Supreme Court in City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.5 rejected the
City's contention that Congress had intended to exempt mu-
nicipalities from the antitrust laws. Though a majority of the
Court in Lafayette agreed that municipalities should not re-
ceive the same deference as states under the state action doc-
trine, there was no majority agreement as to the standard to
be applied for deciding when a municipality would be
exempted.
0 1982 by Donald M. Hartford, Jr.
1. 1 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 1.
2. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
3. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes
"[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations ...
illegal." Id. at § 1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpo-
ration, or if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
Id. at § 2.
4. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1942). The exclusion is based on concerns of federalism
and interpretation of the intended scope of the Act. The court in Parker stated: "In a
dual system of government in which, under the constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unex-
pressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to
be attributed to Congress." Id.
5. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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This comment explores two basic questions: First, when
and what municipal zoning activities will be subject to anti-
trust attack; and, second, what amount of deference is due a
local government, in our federal system, when it acts in its
zoning capacity and is faced with a federal antitrust suit? The
comnnt ultimately advocates a direct balancing of interests:
the state and local interest in sovereignty should be balanced
against the national interest in a competitive economy. This
balancing approach provides a sound basis for addressing
both the national interest in antitrust enforcement and
federalism.
Part II of this comment illustrates how and where munic-
ipal zoning activities are vulnerable to potential antitrust at-
tack and how different states have dealt with anticompetitive
zoning under state law. This section concludes that the ap-
proach state courts use to deal with anticompetitive zoning
often fails to consider the harm a particular zoning activity
can have on the national economy.
Part III looks at substantive antitrust law as applied to
zoning and draws two conclusions. First, because of the dis-
ruptive effect that local zoning regulation may have on the na-
tional economy local governments should not be automatically
exempted from the antitrust laws. Second, the plurality's ap-
proach in Lafayette, exempting local governments from anti-
trust enforcement, fails to protect either of the two objectives
it should protect under Parker and the antitrust laws: con-
cerns of federalism and competition. Part III discusses several
barriers to a plaintiff's successful antitrust challenge of a zon-
ing activity. It highlights the Parker state action exemption as
the line of skirmish in the Burger Court's battle of competing
interests in federalism and antitrust enforcement.
Part IV discusses two historical concerns of federalism,
decentralization and community self-determination, and their
relation to the deference due local governments in our federal
system. This section also notes the trend in federal courts to
abstain in cases involving local land use ordinances, and the
deference due municipalities in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.
Part IV proposes and applies the balancing test men-
tioned earlier. The test weighs the concerns of federalism and
6. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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the national interest in a competitive economy. Part IV then
points out the comparative advantages inherent in a balancing
test as opposed to the test suggested by the Supreme Court
plurality in Lafayette.
The comment concludes that the balancing approach is
preferable. It ensures that neither of the competing interests
involved, federalism versus the national interest in a competi-
tive economy, need be sacrificed at the expense of the other.
II. STATE LAW CONTROL OF ANTICOMPETITIVE ZONING
By definition, zoning puts restrictions on the use of land.7
Zoning restrains trade to the extent that restrictions affect
commercial land use. Construction projects worth billions of
dollars are affected by zoning and subdivision regulations each
year.' The restraints that zoning places on competition are
generally seen as necessary by the attorneys, planners, and lo-
cal governments that support them.' Their arguments in favor
of zoning are usually nothing more than admonishments that
competition will not always facilitate the most efficient alloca-
tion of resources.10 In the antitrust courtroom, competition is
presumed to be the most efficient allocator of resources. Social
and economic justifications will not be entertained unless they
have a procompetitive purpose or accept the presumption in
favor of the free market economy.11
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 the Supreme
Court examined the constitutionality of zoning and found that
such restrictions do not violate the constitution if they have a
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare. s Local zoning regulations are usually challenged
7. Zoning is defined as a species of land use control, consisting of the division of
the whole territory of a municipality into districts, and the imposition of restrictions
on the use of land in such districts. R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 1.13
(2d ed. 1976).
8. Dobele, Book Review, 81 HAav. L. Rzv. 266 (1967).
9. See Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14
ZONING DIG. 33 (1962).
10. Id. The market cannot be relied upon to make the most economic use of
available sites. Under conditions of comparative land scarcity, planning will have to
see to it that the right choices are made. Id. at 41.
11. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
12. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13. Id. at 395. The Court also said that:
[Ulpon the broad ground that the mere existence and threatened en-
forcement of the ordinance, by materially and adversely affecting values
1982]
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in state courts on the basis that the regulations are not related
to one of the broad purposes considered proper for zoning. In
state courtrooms a showing may usually be made of a social
justification that is related to one of zoning's proper purposes,
even though the purpose is not procompetitive.1" Practically
speaking, the state court approach appears rational. Examina-
tion of the approach of state courts to the control of anticom-
petitive zoning, however, reveals that state court review of an-
ticompetitive zoning often results in state court protection
and perpetuation of restraint on trade."8 On the other hand,
the substantive antitrust law approach seems too rigid. Be-
cause most commercial zoning regulations would restrain com-
petition and have no procompetitive purpose, such regulation
would be violative of the federal antitrust law.
Several different zoning practices have been challenged as
anticompetitive in state courts.
A. Zoning to Exclude Business Uses
In Wyatt v. City of Pensacola," the City of Pensacola,
Florida, passed a zoning ordinance which listed permissible
uses in a neighborhood commercial district. The city council
agreed that the district would be suited for dry cleaning es-
tablishments but excluded new establishments for a period of
and curtailing the opportunities of the market, constitute a present and
irreparable injury, the court will not scrutinize its provisions sentence by
sentence, to ascertain by a process of piecemeal dissection whether there
may be, here and there, provisions of a minor character . . . which, if
attacked separately, might not withstand the test of constitutionality.
14. Jurisdictions vary in the weight that control of competition may be given in
making a zoning decision. There are three discernible views taken. The first holds
that control of competition is not a proper purpose in zoning. Kreatchman v. Rams-
burg, 224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345 (1961); Board of County Supervisors v. Davis, 200
Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958); Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal, 324
Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949). The second holds that control of competition may
not be a dominant purpose in zoning. In re Appeal of Lieb, 179 Pa. Super. 318, 116
A.2d 860 (1955). The third allows control of competition to be a factor in zoning.
Ensign Bickford Realty v. City Council of Livermore, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (1977); Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786
(1971); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d 270, 30 Cal. Rptr. 731
(1963); Blair v. Board of Adjustment of Borough of Hatboro, 403 Pa. 105, 169 A.2d 49
(1961); Shapiro v. Town of Oyster Bay, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 414, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961);
Application of Max Kirsch, Inc., 24 Misc. 2d 1074, 202 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup. Ct. 1960);
See generally Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14
ZOMNG DIG. 33 (1962).
15. See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
16. 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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three years. The council did not want to place "the estab-
lished cleaning firms at a competitive disadvantage without
sufficient warning. ' 17 The District Court of Appeal found the
ordinance was not based upon any purpose relating to the
promotion of health, safety, morals, or the general welfare.
The court held the sole basis for delaying the effective date of
the ordinance was to restrict competition in the industry
through the use of the state's police power. It concluded that
this was not a proper zoning purpose.
B. Petition for Exception to a Zoning Ordinance
In Blair v. Board of Adjustment,'8 the plaintiff sought an
exception from a zoning ordinance in order to use her prop-
erty as a site for service stations. There were already three
filling stations in the immediate area. The Board of Adjust-
ment concluded that introduction of new filling stations would
have a disastrous impact upon existing service stations and
denied the petition for exception. It appears that the sole mo-
tive for refusing the petition was to restrain trade. On appeal,
the intermediate appellate court's holding affirming denial
was upheld. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the
Board of Adjustment may well have been in error in taking
into consideration the adverse impact that the granting of the
petition would have on the existing businesses. The court dis-
regarded this, however, because there were several other
grounds for objection, including concerns for public safety
caused by increased traffic.
C. Zoning to Monopoly Power
In Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena," the City
of Pasadena was in the business of providing water to its. re-
sidents and others. It annexed a tract of land where the water
rights were owned by Sunny Slope Water Co., a private water
company. Sunny Slope had already begun to construct a well
on the property. After annexation, Pasadena restricted the
use of the land by zoning it for residential purposes only. The
city subsequently refused Sunny Slope a permit to continue
operating its steam boiler and drilling its well. The city did
17. Id. at 778.
18. 403 Pa. 105, 169 A.2d 49 (1961).
19. 1 Cal. 2d 87, 33 P.2d 672 (1934).
19821
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allow the continued existence of its own wells in residentially
zoned areas. Sunny Slope sued to invalidate the zoning ordi-
nance complaining that the city's motive was to restrain com-
petition and was therefore illegal. The California Supreme
Court held that the city's purpose or motive in passing the
ordinance was irrelevant and immaterial where it fell short of
being fraudulent.20
D. Zoning a Monopoly for Another
In In re White,"1 Atherton, California, zoned 1-1/10 acres
of its 2,500 acres for commercial use. This small area was oc-
cupied by existing businesses. When the plaintiff began run-
ning a commercial enterprise in a residential zone, he was con-
victed of violating the zoning ordinance. He sued to invalidate
the restrictive zoning ordinance. The California Supreme
Court held the zoning ordinance invalid because it was not
related to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare,
and granted a monopoly to the business establishments al-
ready existing in the commercial zone."
Subsequent California cases did not follow In re White.
Zoning ordinances have been held valid because the city had
no intent to create a monopoly3 or because sufficient shop-
ping was available in neighboring communities." In a case
similar to White, Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Coun-
cil,'O the court held that the primary purpose of the city coun-
cil in allowing only one district for business and denying a pe-
tition to rezone another parcel to business was not to create a
business monopoly but to reasonably regulate land use.' An-
other case held that a system of exclusionary zoning which
eliminates all or virtually all commercial uses of property
within a city was invalid'7 because no evidence was introduced
showing a lack of available space in the county or region for
20. Id. at 99, 33 P.2d at 677.
21. 195 Cal. 516, 234 P. 396 (1925).
22. Id. at 520, 234 P. at 397.
23. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City Council, 86 Cal. App. 2d 277, 194 P.2d 720
(1948).
24. See Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29 (1938).
25. 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977).
26. Id. at 477, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
27. Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d
488, 108 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1973).
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the prohibited use.28
State courts, focusing on whether an anticompetitive zon-
ing activity is in the general welfare, may in many cases com-
pletely disregard the anticompetitive effects zoning activity
will have on the economy. The first two zoning activities dis-
cussed above (zoning excluding business uses and petitions for
exception to a zoning regulation) are susceptible to antitrust
attack as agreements or combinations in restraint of trade
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 9 The second two zoning
activities addressed involve monopolization of commerce by
local government action; both would be proscribed by section
2 of the Sherman Act. 0
III. THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW AND THE STATE ACTION
EXEMPTION
Application of the federal antitrust law to local govern-
ment zoning activity may often result in per se violations of
the antitrust laws.3 1
The Sherman Act,3' the Clayton Act,83 and the Federal
Trade Commission Act 4 all contain sections which could be
utilized by a plaintiff injured by the anticompetitive behavior
of a municipality. Anticompetitive local zoning regulation and
activity are potentially violative of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. Zoning regulations may provide the elements
necessary to state a cause of action under the Act. There are,
however, potential barriers to a successful antitrust action,
such as showing an effect on interstate commerce, duality and
the state action exemption.
A. Sherman I: Per Se Violations and The Rule of Reason
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, contracts, combina-
28. Id. at 507-10, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 285-87.
29. See supra note 3.
30. Id.
31. This rigidity is exacerbated by the fact that treble damage awards are man-
dated by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976). It has been argued by
commentators that treble damages need not be mandatory in the case of municipal
antitrust defendants. See generally, 2 P. ARREDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, § 33
(1978).
32. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
33. Id. §§ 12-27.
34. Id. §§ 41-46 and 47-58.
1982]
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tions and conspiracies in restraint of trade are judged illegal
either under per se treatment or under the rule of reason. It
has been held that certain agreements "because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are presumed to be illegal without elaborate inquiry as to pre-
cise harm they have caused or business excuse for their use."' 5
Justice Black, in Northern Pacific Railway,"5 indicated that
there are four types of agreements that should receive per se
treatment: price fixing, market divisions, tying arrangements,
and group boycotts.3 7
In cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act, agreements
in restraint of trade, other than those receiving per se analy-
sis, receive a "rule of reason" analysis. The antitrust laws as-
sume that competition is the best method of allocating re-
sources in a free market. This "statutory policy precludes
inquiry into whether competition is good or bad." 8 The in-
quiry demanded by the rule of reason is whether "the re-
straint promotes or suppresses competition."3 9 Therefore,
under a rule of reason analysis, if it is shown that a zoning
regulation restrains trade, the only evidence admissable to re-
fute the regulation's anticompetitive effect would be evidence
of the regulation's procompetitive purpose.4 ° If, as is the case
with most zoning ordinances, there is no procompetitive pur-
pose, antitrust law precludes showing that a restraint on trade
is required for reasons of social desirability, or any other justi-
fications not related to stimulation of competition.
Zoning activities may provide the framework for three of
the four per se violations: price fixing, market division and
boycott. Commentators have suggested the use of price fixing
in proposed inclusionary zoning regulations."' The inclusion-
35. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978).
39. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
40. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93
(1978).
41. Strauss & Stegman, Moderate-Cost Housing after Lafayette: A Proposal,
11 Urs. LAW. 209 (1979). An inclusionary zoning ordinance is designed to provide
housing for low or moderate income groups in a community. It is the opposite of an
exclusionary ordinance which would have the effect of excluding low or moderate
income groups from a community.
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ary zoning regulations would regulate the resale price of low
cost housing that has been created in the municipality. The
desirability of such a control over the resale price of the hous-
ing is apparent. Once an individual bought such a house he
might have a great incentive to resell it to realize a profit. He
undoubtedly would be assured a high profit on resale as a re-
sult of inflation or of the low price paid for the home. A local
government proposing to protect the availability of low cost
housing in its community would be vulnerable to antitrust at-
tack for maintaining such a program of resale price mainte-
nance. If private individuals were to engage in such collusive
behavior, there would be no doubt of its illegality. Price fixing
is per se illegal.42
Horizontal market division 48 is per se illegal while vertical
market division 44 is to be judged under a "rule of reason"
standard. A zoning ordinance may have the effect of granting
exclusive territory to commercial enterprises. An example of
such an ordinance exists when a city zones an area residential
but exempts existing nonconforming commercial activities. If
the relevant markets are drawn narrowly enough, an exclusive
territory, and perhaps a monopoly, has been granted to the
existing nonconforming commercial activities. Market division
imposed by the zoning ordinance does not fit into either the
horizontal or vertical market division formula. Because it is
not a market division by competitors, it is not horizontal, and
because it is not imposed by a seller or manufacturer, it can-
not be readily analogized to a vertical market division. Never-
theless, a market division by zoning would probably receive a
42. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd., 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
43. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). A horizontal mar-
ket division is an agreement among competitors to compete only in agreed markets.
In Topco, 25 retail grocers agreed to market Topco products only from their exclusive
locations, and not to sell to other retailers. Their market division agreement was held
per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act despite the fact that the grocers
held only an insignificant share of the retail grocery market and were, practically
speaking, incapable of setting market price.
44. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); White Mo-
tor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Vertical market divisions or vertical
territorial restraints are usually manufacturer or seller-imposed restrictions limiting
the territory where a buyer/reseller may do business. In Continental T.V., the Court
found vertically imposed restrictions, unlike per se violations, do not always lack re-
deeming virtues and deserve a rule of reason analysis to determine their legality. One
redeeming virtue was the promotion of interbrand competition. 433 U.S. at 54.
1982]
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rule of reason analysis analogous to vertical market division if
a redeeming virtue in the form of a procompetitive purpose
could be found for the ordinance.4
Group boycotts, although designated by Justice Black in
Northern Pacific Railway' to receive per se treatment, may
receive rule of reason analysis.4 7 The traditional illegal per se
group boycott involves an agreement to exclude a competitor
from the market. The pernicious effect of boycotts is illus-
trated in Klor's v. Broadway Hale Stores.48 Broadway Hale
conspired with wholesale suppliers to exclude Klor's from the
market. Though the loss of one store would have had only a
slight effect on the competitiveness of the market, the Court
found a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
A boycott was established in an Iowa zoning case49 in
which a municipality entered into an agreement with a devel-
oper of a downtown shopping center providing the city would
not allow competing shopping centers to be built. Subse-
quently, a land owner on the outskirts of the city unsuccess-
fully petitioned the city to have his property rezoned as com-
mercial. He claimed that by excluding him from the market,
the city had entered into an agreement with a competitor to
restrain trade.50 The defendant city's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, based on the state action exemption,
was denied. Because the court determined that a more com-
plete factual record should be developed, there was no discus-
sion of rule of reason versus per se treatment for the alleged
boycott. This is, however, the type of boycotting activity
which is traditionally found illegal per se.' 1
B. Sherman 2
Under section 2 of the Sherman Act there are three sepa-
45. See supra note 44.
46. See supra note 16; see, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963) (rule of reason analysis applied where Securities and Exchange Act authorized
N.Y. Stock Exchange to act in an anticompetitive manner).
47. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
48. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
49. Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.
Iowa 1979); see also Nelson v. Utah, 1978-1 Trade Case. 1 62, 128 (D. Utah 1978).
50. Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.
Iowa 1979).
51. See supra notes 38-40 and 46-48 and accompanying text; but see supra note
47 and accompanying text.
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rate offenses: monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and
combining or conspiring to monopolize.52 To state a cause of
action under a charge of monopolizing, the plaintiff must
prove the defendant holds monopoly power within a specific
product and geographic market.53 This is determined by a
showing that the defendant has a sufficient market share to
qualify as having monopoly power." The plaintiff must also
show the "wilfull acquisition or maintenance of the monopoly
power."55 This is sometimes simply referred to as anticompe-
titive conduct. There need be no showing of specific intent"
in section 2 monopolization cases, unlike a cause of action
based on attempted monopoly or conspiracy to monopolize.
The plaintiff need only prove that the defendant had the gen-
eral intent to do the act in question. 7
To establish a cause of action for attempt to monopolize,
a plaintiff must show a specific intent to monopolize and a
dangerous" probability of success." The defendant's substan-
52. See supra note 3.
53. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, (2nd Cir. 1945);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
54. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
Justice Learned Hand stated that a defendant with a 90% market share clearly holds
a monopoly; if, however, a defendant's market share is 60%, monopoly status is
doubtful, whereas a market share of 33% is clearly not a monopoly. Id. at 424. The
Supreme Court later affirmed a lower court holding where a 75% market share was
held to constitute a monopoly. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp.
295 (D. Mass. 1953), afl'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
55. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Examples of
wilfull acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power or anticompetitive conduct can
be found in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953). There, in addition to a monopoly position, the defendant used long term cus-
tomer contracts, rebates for repeat purchases, a policy of free repair service for its
machinery, and exercised a policy of discriminatory pricing.
The conduct of United Shoe was not illegal in itself but was illegal when coupled
with its monopoly power. See also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (use
of monopoly power in one market to affect purchase terms in another market);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (selling below cost to
drive competitors out of business).
56 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911).
57. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
58. Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See
Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)(specific intent inferred from circumstantial evidence where there was wilfull fraud
on the Patent Office); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 180
F. Supp. 125 (D.Mass. 1959) affd in part and rev'd in part, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir.
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tial market share is used to demonstrate dangerous
probability of success.60
To prove a combination or conspiracy to monopolize
under section 2, the plaintiff need only show a specific intent
to monopolize.61 In line with the common law concept of con-
spiracy, cases have also shown an overt act in furtherance of
that conspiracy.6 2
C. Interstate Commerce Requirement
There is a jurisdictional requirement that interstate com-
merce be affected when bringing an antitrust suit. The Sher-
man Act was passed by Congress pursuant to its commerce
clause power. The Court has determined that Congress exer-
cised all the power it possessed under the commerce clause
when it approved the Sherman Act.s In 1890, when the Sher-
man Act was passed, the jurisprudential and congressional in-
terpretation of the extent of the commerce power was, of
course, more restricted than today. Nevertheless, the courts
have allowed the coverage of the Sherman Act to correspond
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961) (specific intent inferred where newspaper
salesmen paid to secretly convince others to advertise in defendant's newspaper).
59. See Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); California Com-
puter Prods. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1979)
(because dangerous probability of success may be inferred from the existence of spe-
cific intent in proper cases, it is not an essential element of an attempt claim).
60. Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d 1068 (3rd Cir. 1978). But cf.
Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977) (alleged
attempt to monopolize by predatory pricing; held dangerous probability of success
needn't be shown by direct proof of the defendant's market power).
61. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States
v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2nd Cir. 1961); Giant Paper & Film
Corp. v. Albermarle Paper Co., 430 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In California, the
state courts have found that zoning regulations have not created monopolies in cer-
tain businesses because the local governments lacked the specific intent to monopo-
lize. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. State causes of action challenging
zoning regulations as conferrals of monopoly may reach the same result in federal
court on antitrust claims where the charge is attempted monopoly or conspiracy to
monopolize. Monopolizing activity by local governments as in Sunny Slope Water Co.
v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 33 P.2d 672 (1934) (see supra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text), only require general intent to monopolize. A finding in state
court that a local government lacked specific intent to monopolize would not mean in
cases such as Sunny Slope that the local government would not be guilty of monopo-
lizations in federal court.
62. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), the defen-
dant's predatory pricing may be seen as the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
to restrain trade.
63. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
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to the courts' expanded interpretation of the commerce
power.
The Court has held that "wholly local business restraints
can produce the effects condemned by the Sherman Act,""
and that "[i]f it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it
doesn't matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze."" A zoning activity or regulation must in the above
context "substantially and adversely"" affect interstate com-
merce. Zoning restrictions frequently affect the real estate
market which is often tied to loans from out of state banks."
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar," the defendant Bar Asso-
ciation had fixed prices for title examinations in the purchase
of real property. The plaintiffs successfully showed that a sig-
nificant amount of interstate commerce was affected where
loans from out of state sources and guarantees on loans from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and Vet-
eran's Administration were involved." It is obvious that not
all antitrust claims involving zoning will meet the jurisdic-
tional requirement of substantially and adversely affecting the
interstate commerce. It is clear, however, that a finding that
interstate commerce has been affected by local zoning regula-
tions is within the reach of a court.
D. Duality Requirement
To have a successful cause of action under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show the existence of "a
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" to restrain trade. 0
This requirement is generally referred to as duality. Zoning
regulations can be viewed as the unilateral act of government;
therefore, the duality requirement may present a barrier to a
plaintiff in alleging a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
64. United States v. Employing Plasterer's Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954) (cit-
ing United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
65. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).
66. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976) (quot-
ing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)).
67. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783 (1975).
68. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
69. Id. at 783. But cf. Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Real-
tors, 578 F.2d 1326 (10th Cir. 1978) (rejection by local board of realtors of broker's
membership application was a local activity which had no impact on interstate
commerce).
70. See supra note 3.
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Act. The barrier is not as great as might appear. The Supreme
Court has evidenced a willingness to find duality in cases aris-
ing under section one. Wholly owned subsidiaries of a single
corporation have been held to be conspirators.7' In Perma
Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp., the Court
found that a combination was formed to restrain trade be-
tween a franchisor and a franchisee "the day he [franchisee]
unwillingly complied with the restrictive franchise agree-
ments .... ,,72 A district court in United States v. Texas
Board of Public Accountancy s found that a combination does
not require a showing of voluntary assent 74 and the fifth cir-
cuit found that a combination existed on the basis of firm and
resolute enforcement of restrictions and the inferrable ac-
quiescense of those coerced.75
It is evident from the tests set forth in the above cases
that the plaintiff should be able to find a combination to re-
strain trade where a local government has restrained trade by
the use of its zoning power. The facts from Wyatt v. City of
Pensacola76 are illustrative. A zoning regulation was passed
which permitted commercial uses within a district, including
existing laundries, but excluded the creation of new dry clean-
ing establishments for a period of two years. Using the reason-
ing from Perma Life and the above cases, it could be shown
that the required combination existed as soon as an individual
who wanted to establish a dry cleaning business acquiesced in
the illegally restrictive zoning ordinance. 77
E. State Action Doctrine
After the Supreme Court decisions in Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power and Light Co.78 and Community Communications
71. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Keifer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
72. 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968).
73. 464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
74. Id. at 403, citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134, 142 (1968).
75. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco, Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.
1976); see also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
76. 196 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); see supra notes 16-17 and accom-
panying text.
77. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
78. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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Co. v. Boulder,"9 local governments may no longer find the
state action exemption from the antitrust laws available to
them. To understand the ramifications of this possibility it is
necessary to consider not only the evolution of the Parker v.
Brown 0 doctrine, but also to look at two major concerns of
the current Court-federalism and support for aggressive an-
titrust enforcement. The Court has emphasized the impor-
tance of both states' rights and enforcement of the antitrust
laws." The inevitable conflict between these two interests is
seen when the Parker state action doctrine is raised in an an-
titrust suit. The result of the conflict between federalism and
the national interest in competition has been an erosion of the
Parker state action doctrine.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lafayette lends strong
support to the proposition that the Burger Court considers
antitrust enforcement to be of paramount importance. Part I
of the majority opinion states that "[a]ntitrust laws in gen-
eral, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms. ' 82 Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority of the
Court, left no doubt as to the Court's view that Congress did
not intend to exempt anticompetitive behavior of local gov-
ernments from the antitrust laws.
If Municipalities were free to make economic choices
counseled solely by their own parochial interests and
without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious
chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be intro-
duced at odds with the comprehensive national policy
Congress established.8
The Court has also stressed federalism principles in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery. In 1974, the Fair Labor
79. 102 S.Ct. 835 (1982).
80. 317 U.S. 341 (1942); see supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
81. E.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (en-
forcement of antitrust laws in the face of states' rights); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (emphasis on states' rights).
82. 435 U.S. at 398 n.16 (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596,
610 (1972)).
83. Id. at 408 (1978).
84. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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Standards Act was amended to extend the act's minimum
wage and maximum hour restrictions to most employees of
states and their political subdivisions. Individual cities and
states challenged the legislation on the grounds that the
amendments exceeded congressional power under the com-
merce clause of the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, quoted Justice Douglas' dissent in Maryland
v. Wirtza8 which cautioned that increasing national assertions
of power left unchecked could "allow 'the national Govern-
ment [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty,' "86
"though that sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amend-
ment. 8 7 The Court held that the amendments were an in-
fringement of state and local government's sovereignty be-
cause they interfered with functions essential to the separate
and independent existence of the states in our federal sys-
tem.88 The Court read the amendments as displacing the
states' ability to perform as states in "their dual functions of
administering the public law and furnishing public ser-
vices .. ."s The Court stated that "there would be little left
of the States' 'separate and independent existence' "90 if Con-
gress could withdraw from the states the power to structure
integral operations in the area of traditional governmental
functions."1
Parker v. Brown"s is recognized as creating the state ac-
tion exemption from the antitrust laws. In Parker, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that a California state raisin mar-
keting program which stabilized the price of raisins by regu-
lating the raisin producer's output was not illegal as constitut-
ing a restraint on trade under the Sherman Act.93 The Court's
holding rested on an inability to find, in the history or lan-
guage of the Sherman Act, congressional intent that the anti-
85. 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968).
86. 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
87. 392 U.S. at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
89. Id. at 851.
90. Id. (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
91. Id. Examples of traditional governmental functions given by the court were
service oriented-fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, parks
and recreation.
92. 317 U.S. 341 (1942).
93. Id.
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trust laws were to be applied to "restrain a state or its officers
or agents from activities directed by its legislature."94 Princi-
ples of federalism, however, were the evident underpinning of
the Court's finding that Congress had not intended the Sher-
man Act to be applied to the state's action. 5
Following Parker, a state action exemption was consist-
ently applied in cases which involved municipal antitrust de-
fendants."' The Burger Court, however, began narrowing the
application of the Parker doctrine. In judicial decisions prior
to Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., the standard
used to determine whether agencies of a state could claim the
state action exemption can best be described as a compulsion
standard. This standard adhered to the language in Parker
which stated there was no implied congressional intent in the
Sherman Act "to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature." 97
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,98 the state found that
the State Bar, claiming a state action exemption as a legal
agency of the state, was not protected by the Parker doctrine.
The State Bar was not acting under compulsion of the state as
sovereign and could not claim a Parker exemption from the
antitrust laws.99
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,100 the Arizona Supreme
Court had imposed a ban on attorney advertising. As an agent
of the State of Arizona, the Supreme Court was viewed as the
ultimate body wielding the state's power over the practice of
law. Quoting Goldfarb, the Bates Court held that the restraint
of trade was "compelled by direction of the State acting as a
sovereign,"' 0 1 and the state action exemption was granted.
The Court emphasized that the anticompetitive restraint was
part of a comprehensive regulatory system which was clearly
94. Id. at 350-51.
95. Id. The Court went on to say, however, that "a state does not give immunity
to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declar-
ing that their action is lawful. . . and we have no question of the state or its munici-
pality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
96. New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Con-
tinental Bus Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359 (D. Tex. 1974).
97. 317 U.S. at 350-51 (1942).
98. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
99. Id. at 791.
100. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
101. Id. at 360.
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articulated and affirmatively expressed and that the state's
supervision was active.102 Similar language has been empha-
sized in subsequent decisions to determine the applicability of
the state action exemption.'0 8
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,'0 4 the Court refused to
grant a state action exemption to Detroit Edison. Although
the standard applied in Cantor was not strictly a compulsion
standard,'05 the case can be explained in this way."06 The Can-
tor case did not involve a state agency but a private utility.
Detroit Edison was engaged in providing electricity to custom-
ers and along with this service provided "free" light bulbs.
When a light bulb retailer brought an antitrust suit claiming
market foreclosure, Detroit Edison claimed the state action
exemption on the grounds that its program of light bulb dis-
tribution had been approved by the Michigan Public Service
Commission. It further contended that the Commission's ap-
proval had compelled its distribution of light bulbs along with
electricity. The plurality decision concluded that the State of
Michigan had no statewide policy relating to the monopolizing
of light bulb distribution. 0 7 It found that the state was neu-
tral on the question of such distribution, so Detroit Edison
could not claim a state action exemption. 08
In 1978 the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether a municipality should be automatically exempted
from the antitrust laws in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
102. Id. at 362.
103. Community Communication Co. v. Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835 (1982); see Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Alum., Inc., 455 U.S. 97 (1980).
104. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
105. See id. at 629 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Court in Cantor actually relied
on a test extending the implied immunity doctrine. The implied immunity or implied
repealer doctrine is a court created doctrine which has been used to reconcile conflict-
ing federal statutes. Under this doctrine, the basic rule is that repeal of a first by a
second federal statute will not be favored. As Justice Stewart points out in his dis-
sent, "implied repealer of federal antitrust laws by inconsistent state regulatory stat-
utes is not only 'not favored'. . ., it is impossible." Id. at 629-30 (citing U.S. CONST.
art. IV, cl. 2). Such a formulation for finding a state action exemption from the anti-
trust laws flies in the face of the Constitution's supremacy clause. No majority has
followed this analysis-presumably because of the weakness of the theory as pointed
out by Justice Stewart.
106. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 n.40
(1978). Justice Brennan interprets Cantor this way in Lafayette.
107. 428 U.S. at 579.
108. Id.
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Power and Light Co.10 9 The common standard in the state ac-
tion cases decided before Lafayette has been one of compul-
sion. That standard was modified when the antitrust defen-
dant was a municipality.
In Lafayette the city operated a municipally owned util-
ity system under state authority. It brought suit against Loui-
siana Light and Power Co., a private utility, claiming antitrust
violations. Louisiana Power counterclaimed, claming that the
city had conspired to bring sham litigation against the pri-
vately owned utility and had entered into illegal tying ar-
rangements-tying purchases of city water and gas to
purchase of electricity. A majority of the Court rejected the
city's contention that Congress had intended to exempt mu-
nicipalities from the antitrust law." 0 A plurality of the Court
found that Parker did not automatically exempt local govern-
ments from the antitrust laws."' The plurality decided that
the Parker doctrine exempted municipal anticompetitive con-
duct which was authorized," 2 directed,"' or contemplated by
the state in connection with a state policy to displace compe-
tition with regulation or monopoly public service."' It empha-
sized that the state policy upon which a municipality relies
must be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed." 5
The plurality found that cities are not themselves sover-
eign and thus "do not receive all the .. .deference of the
States that created them.""' The Court went on to state that
109. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 408.
112. Id. at 415.
113. Id. at 416.
114. Id. But cf. id. at 425-26 (Burger, C. J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
would have applied the standard announced for private entities in Cantor v. Detroit
Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (see supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text). In addi-
tion, the Chief Justice made a distinction between local government's "proprietary"
and "non-proprietary" functions. He found that cities engaged in proprietary func-
tions would not automatically be exempt from antitrust enforcement under Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1942) (see supra note 4), but Chief Justice Burger did not
speak of nonproprietary functions such as zoning. Despite the theoretical softness of
the Cantor test, the Chief Justice's attempt to distinguish municipal liability under
the antitrust laws on the basis of the activity in which the city is involved and his
discussion of the federalism concerns of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), is an attempt to grapple directly with the issue that is raised in Lafayette:
federalism and the degree of deference due the City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 423-25.
115. 435 U.S. at 410 (1978).
116. Id. at 412.
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the city could not be exempted from the antitrust law "[i]n
light of the serious economic dislocation that could result if
cities were free to place their own parochial interests above
the nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust
laws. . . . "11 Because of this serious economic dislocation the
Court found itself unwilling to presume that Congress in-
tended to exclude anticompetitive municipal action from its
reach."'8
The Supreme Court decided two state action cases after
Lafayette which did not involve municipal defendants. The
Court in these two cases applied a standard which utilized
language found in Bates and Lafayette. The first was New
Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,"1 9 a
case involving a defendant-state agency. The Court held that
actions of the Board were within the state action exemption
because the challenged regulatory scheme was a "clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed" ' policy of the state.
In the second case, California Retail Liquor Dealers
Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 2 the defendant was a pri-
vate entity. Midcal required that the defendant show not only
that the activity with which he was charged was one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, but
also required that the activity be "actively supervised" by the
state itself."' The Court relied on Lafayette as authority for
the active supervision standard. '
In Community Communications Company, Inc. v. City of
Boulder,12 the first state action case involving a municipal de-
fendant since Lafayette, a majority of the Supreme Court de-
nied the City of Boulder a state action exemption. Boulder, a
home rule municipality, granted Community Communications
Company (CCC) a revocable non-exclusive permit to conduct
a cable television business in Boulder. Because CCC had a
head start on competition and because the city was concerned
that the company might not be the best operator for the city,
117. Id. at 412-13.
118. Id. at 413.
119. 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).
120. Id.
121. 445 U.S. b7 (1980).
122. Id. at 105.
123. Id.
124. 102 S.Ct. 835 (1982).
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Boulder passed an "emergency" ordinance which prohibited
CCC from expanding its business for a period of three
months. CCC brought suit in federal court alleging that the
ordinance violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Courtheld that Boulder's ordinance was not exempt from antitrust
scrutiny, pursuant to the state action exemption, unless the
ordinance constituted the action of the State of Colorado it-
self in its sovereign capacity or "municipal action in further-
ance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed state policy."' 28 The opinion did not reach
the question of whether a municipal defendant must satisfy
the "active state supervision" standard articulated in Midcal
because Boulder failed to meet the first standard enunciated
in that case.' 26 The Court cited Lafayette as the genesis of the
active state supervision requirement; therefore, it appears
that the Court may, in a future case, require municipalities to
meet this standard as well before the state action exemption
will apply. 27
The Parker doctrine established an implied intent to ex-
empt the state from antitrust enforcement. This comment ac-
cepts the Lafayette and Boulder position that the disruptive
potential local governments can have on the national economy
is so great that it is impossible to impute to Congress an in-
tent to automatically exclude municipalities from the anti-
trust laws under the Parker doctrine. There is, however, the
danger that the Boulder decision will lead to an increase in
government centralization and a decrease in the individuals'
immediate access to local public decision making. Because of
this danger, this comment proposes that principles of federal-
ism would be better served by a balancing analysis as opposed
to the Boulder approach requiring an affirmative statement of
state policy and perhaps active state supervision.
Justice Brennan purportedly based the holding in Boul-
der on the federalism principle which supports the Parker
state action exemption: "Ours is a 'dual system of govern-
ment' which has no place for sovereign cities.' ' 2 8 Part IV of
this comment disagrees with the Boulder decision's refusal to
125. Id. at 841.
126. See id. at 841 n.14.
127. See Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737,
742-43 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
128. 102 S.Ct. at 842.
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show any deference to local governments. Municipalities have
not been considered sovereign by the federal courts, but they
have been accorded deference in several contexts based on
more general federalism concerns.12 The federalism concern
that shaped these decisions might best be described as the
Jeffersonian concept of federalism.
IV. ANTITRUST AND FEDERALISM-THE COMPETITIVE ECON-
OMY VERSUS COMMUNITY SELF-DETERMINATION
A popular understanding of what federalism meant to the
drafters of the Constitution was articulated by Thomas Jeffer-
son.3 0 Jefferson's emphasis "was on local government to pre-
vent centralization and to provide citizens with the opportu-
nity of self-government in their immediate affairs."''
A traditional and essential attendant to the functioning
and existence of the states since the days of the New England
townships and town meetings has been public access and con-
trol over local government.' 3 ' The reality of the way in which
state governments have operated in the past and the way in
129. See Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 850 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see infra notes 130-66 and accompanying text.
130. PATrERSON, THE CONSTrTUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 106-16
(1953).
131. Id. at 109 (emphasis added). Thomas Jefferson referred to all levels of gov-
ernment, local, county, state and federal as being republics. In a letter to Joseph
Cabell, February 2, 1816, he stressed the importance of individual public access to
local government in his scheme of federalism. "Where every man is a sharer in the
direction of his ward republic ... he will let the heart be torn out of his body sooner
than his power be wrested from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte." Id. Though a
popular understanding of federalism is not a legal one, Thomas Jefferson's interpre-
tation of federalism may fit within the definition of federalism espoused by National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Throughout Part III of National
League of Cities, id. at 852-856, the point is made that decentralization stands for
increased access to public decision making and this is part and parcel of why the
state exists. When the federal government infringes upon the basic structuring of a
state's political processes, there is danger of the state ceasing to provide government
access to its citizens.
132. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism and Mandat-
ing State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1210-11 (1977). Professor Stewart illustrates how federalism and individual rights in
our decentralized system are linked. He sees several elements of a decentralized fed-
eral structure which are valued by the individual which "include the greater sensitiv-
ity of local governments to the preferences of citizens and the costs of achieving envi-
ronmental goals in a given locality; the diffusion of governmental power and the
promotion of cultural and social diversity; and the enhancement of individual partici-
pation in and identification with governmental decisionmaking." Id. at 1231.
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which they operate today is an acceptance of the Jeffersonian
concept of federalism. Home rule charters and broad enabling
acts are the methods that a majority of the states use to grant
power to local governments.133 The federal courts have recog-
nized the importance of allowing the states power and discre-
tion to operate in accord with the Jeffersonian concept of
federalism."3 4
Boulder's holding, that local governments may never act
in a sovereign capacity undirected by the state, will greatly
undermine what federalism has stood for since the founding
of our nation, i.e., decentralization and increased access to
public decision making. It is important to the vitality of our
democracy that citizens have public access to the public deci-
sion making process at the local level on questions as basic as
the regulation of their property. If the state must authorize
and supervise a local government's zoning activities, 35 it is
clear that the individual will feel less in touch with the demo-
cratic process of which he is, theoretically, the most important
part.186
The federal courts have accorded local governments such
133. See Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 269 (1968).
134. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978);
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat) 204, 226 (1821); cf. New York Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(arguing for the importance of states as social and economic laboratories) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
135. See Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737,
742-43 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (suggests state must set up a distinct agency actively super-
vising city zoning before such zoning would be within the state action exemption).
136. See L. TRIBE, AMEsIcAN CONsTrrutnoNAL LAW, 308-18 (1978). Tribe links
federalism as it has been defined by National League of Cities with the affirmative
rights of individuals:
Once one recognizes individual rights against the government for certain
basic services, the problems become those of framing a system in which
these rights can and will be meaningfully enforced. National League of
Cities v. Usery may provide an important prototype-at least in areas
where the federal government has left to the states and localities the
responsibility for fulfilling individual claims to service provision. If the
decision is justifiable, it is not simply because of any inherent rights of
states; no such rights were truly threatened in this case. As a result, the
state's central claim must be that, while the individual right is against
the government, when the federal government leaves to states and lo-
calities the fulfillment of the government duty, it cannot act so as to
undermine the ability of states and their subdivisions to perform that
duty.
Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
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deference in preemption cases, in land use abstention cases,
and in National League of Cities v. Usery. s- 7
In preemption cases, the courts have given local govern-
ment regulations deference equal to that of state regulations
without inquiry into whether the local regulations were in fur-
therance or implementation of actively supervised state pol-
icy. In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,s the
Supreme Court held that a municipal smoke abatement ordi-
nance was enforceable though federal regulations also estab-
lished emissions guidelines. The Court found the municipal
ordinance and federal regulations had different purposes; they
were not in conflict so there was no federal preemption.
The abstention doctrine 8' has been used in land use
cases in federal courts as a means of protecting principles of
federalism.14 0 While fewer than ten land use cases decided
prior to 1970 discussed abstention, at least fifty since 1970
have discussed it."'
Burford v. Sun Oil' is important in discussing zoning,
land use, and the evolving tendency of federal courts to ab-
stain in land use cases. On the basis of diversity jurisdiction,
Sun Oil appealed to the federal court from a decision of the
Texas Railroad Commission. The decision of the Railroad
Commission involved land use and the regulation of the
state's oil resources. The Court abstained, holding that an ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction would disrupt a state regulatory and
137. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
138. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
139. The abstention doctrine has been judicially created. Generally, federal
courts have a duty to hear any matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, however, in
particular cases they may use their discretion to abstain. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention appropriate where prior disposition of
state law questions obviate a federal constitutional issue); see also Trainor v. Her-
nandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (state civil proceeding where important state interests
involved); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (abstention held appropriate where
federal jurisdiction invoked to restrain state criminal proceedings); Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (abstaining where a complicated regulatory system of
local law involved important public policies).
140. See Note, Federal Abstention in Land Use Cases, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REv. 223 (1980); Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doc-
trine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134 (1980).
141. Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine,
89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1135 n.8. Federal courts in California have abstained in nearly all
cases challenging the state's progressive land use regulations.
142. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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administrative process. 1 3 Courts have stressed that absten-
tion is an extraordinary disruption of federal jurisdiction to be
used only in exceptional circumstances where the order to the
parties would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest. 144
In Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Thibodaux City,4 5
where the land use issue was eminent domain, the Supreme
Court found such a countervailing interest. The Court empha-
sized that land use represented an aspect of the state's sover-
eign prerogative. 146 In cases where zoning is involved, there
normally will be two elements which play a part in the court's
decision to abstain: a land use issue and a state or local regu-
latory scheme. Courts have utilized Burford as precedent to
abstain in zoning cases without questioning whether the pol-
icy against interfering with state administrative programs
should apply to local governments.1 17 In Kent Island Joint
Venture v. Smith,14 the court found it particularly appropri-
ate to abstain "because of principles of federalism which be-
come particularly significant when a federal court is asked to
review land use policies or zoning decisions of a local
government. 1 4
The tendency of the federal courts to abstain in land use
and zoning cases illustrates the importance of these decisions
in relation to principles of federalism, and demonstrates that
local regulations have received deference in federal court
without inquiry into state authorization or compulsion. 15 0 A
number of lower court decisions have tied federal interference
143. Id. at 334.
144. County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
145. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
146. Id. at 26.
147. Fralin & Waldron Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974);
Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978); Stallworth v.
City of Monroeville, 426 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Ala. 1976).
148. 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978).
149. Id. at 56.
150. This comment does not advocate the use of abstention from federal anti-
trust causes of action. Abstention is deemed appropriate where states have concur-
rent subject matter jurisdiction with the federal courts. See 10 AM. JUR. BANKS,
(1963). The federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over violations of
the federal antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Nevertheless, several antitrust cases
have discussed abstention in antitrust suits and have not automatically precluded it.
These cases did not involve land use issues. See Mach-Tronics Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316
F.2d 820, 824-28 (9th Cir. 1963); Schenley Indus. Inc. v. New Jersey Wine and Spirits
Wholesalers Ass'n., 272 F. Supp. 872, 882-83 (D.N.J. 1967).
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with land use decisions and its impact on principles of feder-
alism to the National League of Cities rationale. 151
The Court in National League of Cities made no differ-
entiation between local and state government in regard to va-
lidity of the Fair Labor Standards Act. National League of
Cities stands for the proposition that a traditionally provided
service or essential function of state government may not be
subject to federal interference whether the state or local gov-
ernment is the provider of the service or essential function.
There was no search for state authorization or compulsion in
National League of Cities.1 52
The Boulder decision is an intrusion into the operation of
state and local governments. This comment proposes a stan-
dard for local government exemption which takes into account
the principles of federalism upon which Parker rests and gives
equal consideration to the national interest in a competitive
economy. First, it must not be assumed that local government
activities should not receive federal deference. As seen above,
a degree of deference has been accorded local government.' 8"
Second, the Court should not require that a local zoning activ-
ity be in furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy and that it be actively
supervised by the state. These requirements may lead to in-
creased centralization of government and decreased public ac-
cess to local decision making.154 For that reason, it should be
replaced with a standard that balances the competing inter-
ests.1 The balancing should resemble that used by the courts
in cases where state laws regulating commerce come into con-
flict with federal legislation regulating commerce under the
commerce clause.1"' The court should balance the adverse im-
151. Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 463-64 (D.Md.
1978). In Kent Island, the court held that "[c]onsiderations of federalism requiring
deference to the state in the area of state government employment . . . apply with
even more force in the area of state land use policy, an area traditionally considered
'distinctly a feature of local government.'" Id. at 463-64, quoting Hill v. El Paso, 437
F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1971).
152. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
153. See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
155. This approach has been advocated by a number of commentators. See, e.g.,
Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doc-
trine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 31 (1979); Note, Application of
the State Action Doctrine to Municipalities, Nw. U.L. REv. 570 (1979).
156. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transport, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978).
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pact that a local anticompetitive zoning action would have on
the competitive economy against the degree to which state
sovereignty and public access and control over local govern-
ment are infringed. In balancing these concerns, the courts
should ultimately exempt from the antitrust law only those
zoning activities that minimally restrain competition in the
areas the local government controls or in the region within
which the local government interacts commercially.
Several factors may be considered in the balancing of in-
terests. When considering the adverse impact on the competi-
tive economy, the court should examine the type of restraint
imposed. If it is a restraint under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, is it a per se violation or a restraint which would receive a
rule of reason analysis? If a monopoly is created, how large is
the market which is constricted-a neighborhood, a block, a
region? If a zoning ordinance restricts competition within an
area of a city but allows for competition at another locale, the
burden on the competitive economy is not as great, but if
competition is restricted significantly, there should be no ex-
emption for the local government unless it is acting as an arm
of the state. As to the infringement on the state and on indi-
viduals' rights of access to local government, the degree of in-
fringement may be gauged by looking first at the activity in
question. Under National League of Cities, if it is determined
that the antitrust laws unduly interfere with a traditional and
essential function of state or local government such as fire
prevention, police protection, public health, sanitation, and
parks and recreation, then the infringement is a great burden
to be overcome. Local land use control has also been viewed as
a fundamental and traditional function and a prerogative of
local government, 157 and in the majority of cases involving
zoning, a great deal of weight has been placed on this side.
Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his concurrence in Lafay-
ette that the Court has differentiated between a state's deci-
Justice Powell stated that "[o]ur recent decisions make it clear that the inquiry nec-
essarily involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the states regu-
latory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of com-
merce". In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Alum. Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980), Justice Powell seems to play with the antitrust issues as if he never were
balancing it: "We need not consider whether the legitimate state interests in temper-
ance and small retailers ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a
competitive economy." 445 U.S. 97, 113-14 (1980).
157. See supra note 151.
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sions furthering a proprietary interest and a state's sovereign
decisions for the purposes of federalism. ' State and munici-
pal zoning activity designed solely to further a proprietary in-
terest of a local government would not, under this view, be
accorded the weight of a zoning activity which went toward a
non-proprietary interest of the local government.
In order to better understand how this balancing test
would work, it will be applied to the antitrust zoning case,
Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City. ' In Mason
City, the city council entered into an agreement with a con-
tractor to construct a shopping center in downtown Mason
City. Part of the agreement was that the city would not allow
another regional shopping center to compete with the contrac-
tor. A landowner on the outskirts of Mason City petitioned to
have his property rezoned from agricultural to commercial in
order to build a competing shopping center. When the peti-
tion was denied, the land owner brought an antitrust suit. The
Iowa zoning statute is a general enabling statute. There were
no facts relating to the city council's purpose in entering into
the agreement or in denying the rezoning.160
This case, decided before Boulder, is illustrative of the
way in which lower courts have interpreted Lafayette. The
federal court read Lafayette in conjunction with California
Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc."1 as
requiring that the municipal defendant show that its zoning
activity was required by the state as sovereign and that it is
part of a comprehensive regulatory system that is clearly ar-
ticulated, affirmatively expressed, and actively supervised by
the state.162 The decision, by suggesting that a distinct agency
be established to protect local zoning ordinances from anti-
trust suit, stretches Parker to the extent that the state action
exemption is no longer recognizable as a doctrine protecting
158. 435 U.S. at 418-24.
159. 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
160. In an antitrust suit, social justifications unrelated to a procompetitive pur-
pose are not heard. See supra note 40. But see supra note 12. Inquiry into the pur-
pose of a zoning activity is the standard test in state courts for testing the validity of
the action.
161. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
162. The court, in speaking of the Iowa enabling statute, stated: "Finally, the
state statute does not set up any distinct agency or mechanism for active supervision
of the cities' zoning procedures by the state as sovereign policy maker." Mason City
Center Assoc. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
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principles of federalism.
In a balancing approach, the first beneficial result is the
jettisoning of encouragement for further coerced centraliza-
tion of state government. In balancing the interests, the ad-
verse impact of the local government's agreement to exclude
competitors and its refusal to rezone must be weighed. This
action amounts to a boycott under antitrust laws and boycotts
may amount to per se violations. Other facts not discussed in
Mason City should be considered. For example, were there
other commercial sites for creating such a regional shopping
center available in nearby towns? 6 ' This would ameliorate
the impact of the anticompetitive zoning activity because it
would allow a base from which other shopping centers could
compete for the Mason City market.
On the opposite side must be weighed the degree to which
state sovereignty and individuals' rights to local government
are infringed. To the extent that these are zoning and land
use decisions of local government, they must be given great
weight. However, if it could be shown that the agreement be-
tween the city council and the contractor was outside the
scope of city zoning activity and was not related to land use,
there would be much less weight on this side of the scale.
Likewise, arguments can be made that zoning and land use
control are the types of traditional and essential governmental
services and functions which local governments are expected
to provide and so are protected from federal infringement by
National League of Cities.'"
If it were stipulated that there was not a total exclusion
from the region by the actions of the council, and that there
were sites available for competitors in nearby towns, this com-
mentator would grant a state action exemption to Mason City.
On balance, the relative harm to the competitive economy
would be slight in comparison to the intrusion into the sover-
eign affairs of the state.' "
163. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of
monopoly zoning by the California state appellate courts).
164. On the other hand, zoning in the United States did not begin on a full
scale until after Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), so it may
be argued that zoning is not traditional. Since Houston does not zone, it is also argua-
ble that it is not essential. See Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 71
(1970).
165. There are still state causes of action that could invalidate both the city
council's agreement and the refusal to rezone. As to the council's agreement, courts
1982] 929
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
If, on the other hand, evidence were introduced to show
that the decision of the council was unrelated to land use con-
siderations or that the city council's agreement with the con-
tractor had in fact substantially excluded competition in the
regional shopping center market, the conclusion would be that
no exemption should apply to the local government action un-
less the local government was acting as an arm of the state.
Concerns of federalism would be outweighed by the national
interest in a competitive economy.
V. CONCLUSION
Federalism, including in its definition the concept of com-
munity self-determination and decentralization, is as essential
to our political process as the protection of competition is to
our national economy. Part I of this comment illustrated how
state law attempts to deal with anticompetitive zoning can re-
sult in a complete disregard of the anticompetitive effect that
a zoning restriction may have on the economy. Part II showed
that if federal antitrust law is applied to local government
zoning it may result most often in per se violations of the an-
titrust law. Due to the importance of both the national inter-
est in a competitive economy and state and local federalism
concerns, it is necessary that the competing interests be bal-
anced in zoning antitrust cases. A balancing approach is pref-
erable to the Boulder approach which promotes centralization
and will lead to diminishment of citizens' rights of access to
the local decision making process. Also under this approach,
deference may be shown local governments on the basis of
federalism without sacrificing the national interest in a com-
petitive economy.
Donald M. Hartford, Jr.
have held that zoning boards cannot barter away their police power. Harnett v. Aus-
tin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956). As to the refusal to rezone, if the sole purpose of the
agreement and denial of petition were to prevent competition, the refusal to rezone
would be invalid under state law. See supra note 14.
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